The purpose of this book is not to take static snapshots of the current balance-of-power situation but rather to grasp the dynamic aspects of the political system, that is, its elasticity and sustainability.
Destruction of China’s self-image as a leading cultural “Middle Kingdom.” Creation of a national victim complex and erratic nationalism.
The dominance of the Communist Party, which is not checked by any independent bodies to monitor its activities, is not only due to the typical characteristics of a Communist Party dictatorship, but also due to traditional Chinese concepts of social and political order. In the course of China’s political history, no nationwide institutionalized constituencies or rival autonomous organizations (churches, regional authorities…) were tolerated as legitimate counterweights within the existing order so as to create any form of a separation of powers such that existed in the West. Instead, the Emperor reigned supreme over the entire country, with unlimited authority.
At the same time, there are a number of media representatives who find it problematic that reports about China by foreign correspondents only focus on “conflicts, crises, and catastrophes.”
These authors claim that the key US media continued to be influenced by the “victory of capitalism and democracy” paradigm. In addition to ideological and political axioms, Western media coverage of China is also shaped by a one-sided definition of “Western modernism.” Only if China adopts core elements of modernism based on the “Western model” (markets, technology, and social insurance) will it be judged favorably by the Western media. As long as it openly rejects and violates the core principles and role models of “Western modernism” (democracy, rule of law, freedom of speech, and freedom of the press), China will remain an anomaly and a source of provocation.
Perhaps more than any other country, the PRC presents social scientists with considerable challenges in attempting to identify universal laws.
In the late 1990s, the key conventional indicators of income and wealth inequalities in China had already exceeded the critical levels that typically lead to the onset of social destabilization, which is marked by widespread violent crime and recurrent social unrest. The predicted consequences of such social inequalities in China have not yet materialized.
Based on this insight, researchers focusing on decentralization and federalism have concluded that it is beneficial to decentralize as many state functions as possible — not only to cater to the differing regional requirements, but also to enable a higher level of diversity and flexibility in the governing system. However, according to the Chinese Constitution, the PRC is a centralized unitary state.
The numerous “minor traditions” with a religious content (Buddhism, Daoism, and Christianity) or even individualistic and anarchistic tendencies (Daoism and, in particular, the Stratagems) either go beyond the boundaries of a “state-friendly” doctrine or stay below the radar screen.
To a greater or lesser extent, power politics and ideological interests determine which members of the leadership will band together to form loose coalitions or entrenched “factions” if there is prevailing conflict. Disputes within the highest echelons or the party penetrate all the way to the lowest levels of the party organization and generally lead to the losers being “purged” from the decision-making bodies.
The party was conceived of as a centralized hierarchical organization for political mobilization and control. With its structure of party committees and party cells, it was intended to serve as the absolute decision-making and supervisory power in all sectors of the socialist system (government, the judiciary, industry, and public associations).
- A CCP monopoly in matters regarding recruiting, deploying, and supervising leading personnel (the “cadre system”) not only in party, government, and administrative bodies, but generally also in government-related economic enterprises and in state-controlled and state-financed organizations.
- An internal party discipline commission outside of the state judiciary that operates in accordance with political instructions and grants party cadres de facto immunity from investigations by state judiciary bodies.
The size of the full-time party apparatus has been reduced since the 1980s and it now focuses primarily on political and organizational surveillance activities, particularly those affecting the cadre system and personnel policy, disciplinary surveillance and combatting corruption, media oversight and propaganda, as well as internal security and the secret services. Regular administrative and policy implementation has been transferred to state bodies.
Beginning in 1945, Mao’s writings were canonized by the CCP as “Mao Zedong Thought.” This is revealed, for example, by a downgrading of the working class in favor or the farmers by an emphasis on revolutionary guerrilla warfare.
Such officially propagated “values” appeared to be too remote from the reality of the lives of most Chinese; from the perspective of the people, the official party ideology no longer had any connection to everyday life.
The Chairman of the PRC, referred to simply as “the President,” who is allowed to serve a maximum of two 5-year terms, engages in “affairs of state,” which remain unspecified in the constitution. Since the 1990s, the office effectively served diplomatic purposes and foreign-policy profiling of the CCP general secretary.
People’s courts and people’s procuratorates perform their duties “independently, in accordance with the provisions of law, not subject to interference by any administrative organ, public organization, or individual.” At the same time, the judicial organs are accountable to the people’s congresses, which in turn are responsible for appointing the leading judges and procuratorates.
According to the constitution of the PRC, the NPC as the legislative body has authority to revise the constitution. In practice, initiatives and concrete suggestions for constitutional revisions originate with the top leadership of the CCP. Constitutional revisions reflect changes in the political orientation of the party.
The system of political institutions that exists in the PRC has not been fundamentally affected by any of the constitutional revisions that until now have been enacted. The constitution of the PRC remains primarily a political document.
De facto, the CCP stands above the constitution and the people: the party, and not the people, is the sovereign of the state. Thus, in practice, the state constitution has limited impact regarding the formation of political will, conflict resolution, and decision-making.
In terms of its membership, the CCP is the largest political party in the world. By the end of 2014, the number of its members totaled 87M, that is, about 6.4% of the entire population.
The average age of members of the 18th CCP CC is 56.1. The PLA is represented by 40 officers, constituting about one-fifth of the total number of full members of the CCP CC. In addition, the CC also includes 25 senior managers of major SOEs who, as an economic interest group, wield considerable influence in Chinese politics.
In contrast to representatives of the state economy, not a single representative from a private company was elected to the 18th CCP CC, although the number of private entrepreneurs among the National Communist Party Congress delegates has increased since 2002.
The CCDI has repeatedly served as an extra judicial body in spectacular corruption cases and has often led investigations into local corruption by sending delegations of high-ranking teams of investigators to SOEs or local governments.
Under the National Defense Law, the loyalty of the military is first and foremost to the party rather than to the constitution or the central government.
The CCP CC Secretariat prepares Politburo sessions and decisions, and supervises implementation of party resolutions. Key departments of the CCP Center are represented on the CCP CC Secretariat to ensure policy coordination among the various areas of responsibility.
The General Office of the CCP CC is the lynchpin of ongoing activities at party headquarters. The responsibilities of the General Office include preparing for meetings, distributing and storing CCP CC documents, preparing information for leading party cadres, and providing personal security. The General Office also makes budget allocations for the various organs at party headquarters. Regional party committees send information and make requests to the party leadership via the CCP CC’s General Office.
Training programs for high- and middle-ranking cadres at the various organization levels of the CCP take place at the party schools. The Central Party School in Beijing has become a key forum for discussions of fundamental questions about domestic and foreign affairs as well as a think-tank for administrative reforms. Its courses, which are regularly attended by central and regional party cadres, provide an opportunity for cadres to meet one another.
The top party leadership had to manage a political balancing act between wealthy entrepreneurs (previously persecuted as “class enemies”) and poorer segments of the population (the “proletariat” who previously had been privileged by CCP policies).
The CCP remains the only organization through which one can obtain political power in China. As of the present, no other elites or organizational groups have emerged either from the economy or the society that can compete with the CCP or challenge its monopoly of power beyond the localities.
However, the central-government ministries do not have the right to encroach upon the competencies of their counterparts at the provincial level; they are only allowed to provide “professional guidance.”
Whereas Guangdong exported as much as South Korea in 2010, exports from Qinghai province only reached the level of exports from Rwanda.
According to State constitution, the State Council can, at any time, “annul inappropriate decisions and orders” issued by regional authorities. In practice, such interference in the work of regional governments is never publicized. Solutions are generally reached behind closed doors by delegations of top-ranking ministerial officials sent from Beijing.
The demands for administrative adaptation both before and after China’s accession to the WTO in 2001 were seized upon by supporters of the radical reorganization measures as a decisive argument to overcome resistance from the established bureaucratic machinery.
The central government in Beijing is responsible for all policy areas and all major structural decisions. What does not exist in China’s system of governance is an organ to represent regional interests in Beijing, that is, a second parliamentary chamber.
On the one hand, nationwide implementation of reform measures and the fight against regional networks of corruption are strongly supported by the general public as well as by foreign investors. On the other hand, the unilateral strengthening of the central party hierarchy and the political submission of the regions will jeopardize some of the essential factors driving China’s development successes to date, namely, the decentralized initiatives and the willingness to experiment. Creating durable institutions for conflict management and a vertical division of powers between the central government and the regions remain unsolved challenges facing China’s political system. As of yet, there have been no visible steps in the direction of establishing a formal federalist system.
Growth in the relocation of production facilities to the mainland created millions of new jobs in China and led to a “de-industrialization” in Hong Kong, where 93% of GDP was generated by the services sector in 2014.
The ExCo of HK is headed by a chief executive who is nominated by an electoral committee and elected for a term of 5 years. This electoral committee is made up of representatives of professional, social, and religious groups as well as political representatives from the HK districts. It is planned that in 2017 the chief executive will be elected by universal suffrage.
The LegCo passes, amends, and revokes bills, controls and approves the budget, taxation, and public spending, and monitors government performance. The procedures for electing members of the LegCo have been amended numerous times since 1997. By 2012, one-half of the 70 members of the LegCo were elected by geographical constituencies through direct elections, whereas the other half were nominated by functional constituencies made up of professional and special-interest groups.
Intense shouting matches and fierce brawls broke out between protestors and counter-protestors, who included agents provocateurs from criminal organizations and secret-service circles. The public protests and street barricades ended after several heated weeks due to a major police crackdown and the sheer exhaustion of the protestors. But the underlying conflicts surrounding the democratization of HK’s system of government and the difficult relationship with the central government remain unresolved.
In general, there is no system of local self-government in China. According to the PRC Constitution, only villages (in the rural areas) and neighborhoods (in the cities) are self-governing units, but they are not part of the formal government hierarchy. Decision-makers at the local levels are not directly elected by the people. They are not autonomous decision-makers with sole responsibility, nor do they merely mechanically carry out orders from higher levels. China’s local governments are in a complicated position, sandwiched between orders from higher government levels and demands for greater political freedoms from local levels.
From the outset, the village elections were designed by the CCP primarily as an instrument to improve the functioning of the existing system. At no time did the party intend to establish new channels for independent interest articulation and co-determination outside the confines of the party-state. On the contrary, village self-governance was meant to ensure implementation of especially unpopular policies (such as family planning, tax collection, and maintenance of public security).
With the abolition of rural levies and taxes by order of the central government in the mid-2000s, the drying up of substantial sources of revenue has also affected village governance. Village chairmen are once again exclusively reliant on funding from higher levels in the hierarchy and on the goodwill or “guidance” of non-elected party and government functionaries in the township governments. In this context, village governments remain far more tightly integrated in the official administrative hierarchy than is suggested by the term “self-governance.”
Cities, counties, and towns/townships are expected, if possible, to fund their assigned public tasks from their own resources. This includes everything from infrastructure and education to healthcare. However, they are seldom in a position to do this effectively because they have no stable tax revenue. Many of the lower administrative units are chronically under financed and deeply in debt. To close the funding gaps, regional-government departments have resorted to a variety of different methods.
The first method is to sell or rent publicly-owned land to real-estate developers, generating substantial additional public revenue for a number of years.
The second method involves funding from higher government levels that is intended to to be invested to improve public services (building and maintaining schools and hospitals, for example). However, instead it has been misappropriated for real-estate and infrastructure projects.
In the third method, because until 2014 Chinese local governments were forbidden from borrowing outside capital (for example, by issuing municipal bonds), many city and country governments established local investment companies (commercial companies operating outside of the public budget). These companies enthusiastically borrowed from the state banks, using public land as collateral.