The temptation to use law or force to gag opponents of one kind or another is difficult to resist. Without freedom to criticize and challenge those acting on our behalf, democracies may degenerate into tyrannies. But it is not just governments that restrict freedom of speech and it is not just political speech that warrants protection.
Free speech is a condition of legitimate government. Laws and policies are not legitimate unless they have been adopted through a democratic process, and a process is not democratic if government has prevented anyone from expressing his convictions about what those laws and policies should be.
If, in a democracy, I have views about how my political representatives are acting, then on this account I should be allowed to express those views in ways that go far beyond putting a cross against a candidate’s name on a ballot form every few years.
Free speech has costs:
What people can say can cause injury, can disclose private information, can disclose harmful public information. It’s not a free zone where you can do anything because nothing matters. Speech matters.
Another aspect of the topic of free speech rarely mentioned is that in a climate where people do not feel able to express their views, or are actively prevented from doing so, it may not be possible simply to internalize the illicit view. Many of us don’t know precisely what we think until we try to express ourselves to an audience or at least a potential audience, and most thinkers develop their ideas by interacting with others who agree or disagree with what they think. While it is true that some political prisoners have written poetry in their heads, only an exceptional writer would be able to house a whole novel or a book-length work of non-fiction in their memory. Furthermore, some kinds of writing require extensive research: where a state forbids the expression of certain sorts of ideas, access to the materials needed to express those ideas in convincing form is also typically denied.
Paternalism — that is, coercing someone for their own good — was in his opinion appropriate towards children, and, more controversially, towards “those backward states of society in which the race itself may be considered in its nonage.” But it was not appropriate towards adult members of a civilized society: they should be free to make their own minds up about how to live. They should also be free to make their own mistakes.
He explicitly defended the value of a “free trade in ideas” as part of a search for truth, though unlike Mill he gave a pragmatic account of truth: “the best test of truth,” he maintained, “is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market.”
Apart from the special considerations arising in times of war, most legal systems which broadly preserve freedom of speech still restrict free expression where, for example, it is libellous or slanderous, where it would result in state secrets being revealed, where it would jeopardize a fair trial, where it involves a major intrusion into someone’s private life without good reason, where it results in copyright infringement, and also in cases of misleading advertising.
Yet the presence of a principle such as the First Amendment has its own associated difficulties: like almost any principle, it is open to a wide range of interpretations with fierce debates about the application and limits on the principle of free expression that this constitutional clause protects.
Human nature is not a machine to be built after a model, and set to do exactly the work prescribed for it, but a free, which requires to grow and develop itself on all sides, according to the tendency of the inward forces which make a living thing.
His ultimate justification for freedom, then, is that it best serves the well-being of each of us and thus all of us. He also believed that other people should not have the deciding say in our development, even if motivated by concern for our own good. We should be free to make our own mistakes rather than be told how we should live. But free speech isn’t just another area in which liberal principles apply. For Mill it is a peculiarly important topic because of its relation to truth and human development.
Mill sets out several arguments for protecting freedom of speech, not just from oppressive government intervention, but also from social pressures. Underlying them all are the assumptions that (a) truth is valuable, and (b) no matter how certain someone is that they know they truth, their judgment is still fallible: they might still be wrong. For Mill, a free market of ideas will increase the likelihood of achieving the best result, namely the emergence of truth and the elimination of error. Furthermore the process of lively debate with opinions from different sides will reinvigorate views that might otherwise be held in an unthinking way.
Mill is particularly concerned that minority opinions should not be silenced just because they are held by very few people. Unfashionable ideas have potential value for the whole of humanity, even if only held by one person:
If all mankind minus one were of one opinion, mankind would be no more justified in silencing that one person than he, if he had the power, would be justified in silencing mankind.
His reason is this. If the view is correct, then humanity misses the opportunity to exchange truth for error. If, however, the view is misguided, then we forfeit an opportunity to reinforce truth through its collision with error. Every opinion has value for us either because it is true, or else because, though false, it reinforces the truth and contributes to its emergence.
In an atmosphere of intimidation and explicit or implicit danger attached to expressing heretical views, only the brave will speak out. The more timid will have some lines of thought and expression shut off to them, and their mental development will be correspondingly cramped. The claim that authorities are justified in silencing those who express immoral opinions again involves a risky assumption of infallibility that may stunt human progress.
For Mill, the acknowledgement of his or her own fallibility is part of what makes someone a serious thinker. Human knowledge progresses when people recognize that they may be wrong even on issues that seem certain to them. Wisdom involves openness to those who disagree with us. It is only when our ideas have been subjected to criticism and all objections considered — if necessary seeking these objections out — that we have any right to think of our judgment as better than another’s.
Even if I believe my opinion to be true, and am highly confident about its truth, unless it is “fully, frequently and fearlessly” discussed, I will end holding it as a dead dogma, a formulaic and unthinking response.
We should then, according to Mill, strive to preserve a situation where ideas are vigorously debated from all sides. Otherwise we risk a kind of mental stagnation that ultimately destroys the meaning of those ideas. We must avoid the sleepy world of reassertion, and replace complacency with challenging argument. Without opponents we of our views we will be less alive as thinkers. And this will be bad not just for us, but for society at large as well. Progress is achieved through a polite battle of ideas rather than through one side having exclusive access to the podium.
The benefit to society of Rousseau’s views was that they were partly true, and that, by being aired, even with their generally false or exaggerated conclusions, they stimulated later writers to avoiding naive optimism, and have continued to do so long after Rousseau’s death.
A fundamental objection to Mill’s arguments is that they are inappropriately fixated on the truth or falsehood of statements. Mill’s model of the arena in which discussions take place is, as we have seen, something like an idealized academic seminar with opinions calmly delivered on each side and truth emerging victorious and invigorated from its collision with error. The point of this extended seminar is to get closer to the truth on any matter and where necessary participants will play devil’s advocate to test ideas to their limit. But life isn’t a seminar. And truth isn’t all that is at stake. Words and other expressions have serious consequences and not everyone uses them in the way that academics discussing a contentious point do (or claim they do). Mill’s vision doesn’t capture what typically happens in present-day disputes about free speech.
One reason why false and offensive speech is permitted in most liberal democracies is precisely because the best answer to bad speech is good speech, rather than censorship.
If we silence those who utter falsehoods, we run the risk of becoming dogmatic, of believing without understanding, or feeling passionate about the evidence supporting our beliefs. We also run the risk that such false beliefs will be given greater credence by the very fact that they are suppressed rather than openly refuted. Austria’s laws turned Irving into something of a free speech martyr.
False views might be relatively harmless to a powerful government, but if, for example, knowledge of how the anti-corruption (and pro-democracy) protestors in Tiananmen Square in 1989 were slaughtered or incarcerated became widespread throughout China, this might be a trigger for political uprising. This might well be the justification for Chinese authorities censoring, with the aid of some Western ISPs, what appears on Internet search engines in China. In other words, Mill’s argument that censors assume infallibility may be beside the point here. What the censors in this case are presumably doing is preventing large numbers of people from learning the truth of the matter, not censoring a view which they sincerely believe to be false. It is the truth that is considered dangerous in this context.
Whenever a creationist invites him to a formal debate about the evidence for evolution, this scientist replies, “That would look great on your CV; not so good on mine.”
No Platform Arguments are not complete censorship. I can believe in your legal right to air your views without having any obligation to provide you with the means to air them. Particularly in the age of the Internet, most of us can find ways to express our views to a wide audience. Complete censorship is an attempt to prevent all expression of particular views. No Platform Argument are about avoiding indirectly endorsing a speaker by providing them with a podium from which to deliver their views.
Some writers claim that an act of giving offence should not be protected by any free speech principle. In other words, when someone sets out to offend an individual or a group (or even does so inadvertently), they should not try to hide behind the shield of free speech. They should be polite and respect other people’s sensitivities. To critics this view is simply a denial of any principle of free speech. The point of a free speech principle is that it protects a wide range of types of expression, a far wider range of views than any reasonable person would want to endorse. This means protecting free speech for those whose views we find deeply offensive, irritating, and with whom we strongly disagree. Free speech is for bigots as well as for polite liberal intellectuals. It is not clear why a principle would merit the name “free speech” if it only protected the views of those we find sympathetic.
And what of the difficulty that a monotheist might be offended every time a polytheist mentioned multiple gods and vice versa? Religious, quasi-religious, and many non-religious groups each have a range of sacred objects, places, myths, and ideas they cherish. To protect all of these from blasphemous mention would be absurd to try and impossible to achieve.
It is not at all clear why only those with religious beliefs should have their views protected from offence.
In order to make good judgments, citizens need to be exposed to a range of ideas; free speech allows citizens to be informed about a variety of views by people who strongly believe in them. This last point is important, since those playing devil’s advocate can rarely imagine themselves into the position of a genuine and passionate believer of the position they are adopting. The ideal is to hear dissenting views from real dissenters not from those imagining what a dissenter might say.
There is a right answer, whether or not we know what that answer is, and that answer can in principle be discovered by investigation of probable and actual consequences.
Moral argument for free speech typically move from a conception of what it is to be a person, to the idea that it is an infringement of someone’s autonomy or dignity — either as a speaker or a listener, or both — to have speech curtailed. It is simply wrong to prevent me speaking my views (or hearing other people’s), whether or not good will ensue from what I say, because what would be failure to respect me as an individual capable of thinking and deciding for myself. Such arguments are based on a notion of the intrinsic value of free speech and its connection with a concept of human autonomy rather than any measurable consequences that might flow from preserving it.
Mill defends the view that extensive freedom of speech is a precondition not just for individual happiness, but for a flourishing society. Without free expression humankind may be robbed of ideas that would otherwise have contributed to its development. Preserving freedom of speech maximizes the chance of truth emerging from its collision with error and half-truth. It also reinvigorates the beliefs of those who would otherwise be at risk of holding views as dead dogma.
Central to Mill’s approach throughout On Liberty is his “Harm Principle”, the idea that individual adults should be free to do whatever they wish up to the point where they harm another person in the process. Mill’s principle is apparently straightforward: the only justification for interference with someone’s freedom to live their life as they chose is if they risk harming other people.
People get upset when their way of life is challenged, yet that upset may be the beginning of doubt and lead eventually to change. Think of all the currently conventional ideas and opinions that were deeply offensive when first voiced. Perhaps, therefore, a condition of being allowed to hear and utter ideas that may challenge other people’s values and beliefs should the willingness to extend the same right to others and thus agree that offensiveness will not be a permissible ground for punishing expression.
If she is right about this, then hardcore pornography is not simply a kind of sex aid, but can be of cognitive importance, since it allows viewers to learn about themselves, and so is not absolutely beyond the scope of any general free speech principle. Overall, she suggests, suppression of hardcore pornography would restrict women’s choices rather than, as writers such as MacKinnon claim, enlarge them.
Moral legalists believe that the role of the state is in part to ensure the survival of a culture, a moral climate, a way of life. Individual freedom is not a value that should be allowed priority over traditional family values, such as those that most Christians subscribe to and most Christian apologists preach (even if they don’t always practise them). For such opponents of pornography, no defence based on a free speech principle would be acceptable. Other values have a far higher status.
This a recurrent issue when discussing free speech. The freedom of speakers and audiences to hear what the wish to hear needs to be balanced against the interests of those who don’t want to hear what is being said, who are offended, disgusted, outraged, or feel violated and degraded by the message.
The benefits to democracy of free speech in part derive from the public having access to a wide range of speakers and opinions. The underlying assumption is that through encountering views with which they disagree, members of the public will focus their own beliefs, and develop their critical engagement with the issues that concern them. Without exposure to a range of positions, individuals may become complacent in their views; they may not even realize that their views are controversial or widely despised.
Unanticipated encounters, involving topics and points of view that people have not sought out and perhaps find quite irritating, are central to democracy and even to freedom itself.
This is connected with the idea that for a deliberative democracy to function citizens must be capable of reflection and debate about the issues that concern them as well as be able to call their elected representatives to account. Also if the tradition of meeting speech with counter-speech is to function, then the counter-speech must be heard, particularly by the people speakers are responding to.
We can filter out whatever we don’t wish to know about. Furthermore we can do this automatically with software that recognizes our interests, likes, and dislikes.
For Eliot it was obvious that great literature builds on and uses the literature of the past. The meaning of any piece of writing in part derives from its relation to other writing, and particularly to the writing of those now dead, who constitute a particular tradition.
But my rights in my novel don’t just extend to control over whether I allow you to publish it. If you gave a reading without my permission, you would also be infringing my copyright. Similarly if you adapted the work in some way. Or even if you chose to lend the copy out for a fee.
Socrates decided that death would be preferable to spending the rest of his life minding his own business and avoiding saying anything controversial.
Getting rid of awkward thoughts simplifies life — in this imagined future anything that could interfere with mindless happiness is incinerated; anything that anyone finds offensive ends up in ashes. In the end the people are scarcely aware that they lost anything. That is another possible future.