Negotiation

The episode is significant precisely because it was so petty. Anything that could conceivably be gained by such a crude maneuver must surely be outweighed by its powerful reminder that in dealing with Soviet leaders one must be constantly on one’s guard. It is illustrative of the Soviet tendency to squander goodwill for marginal gains and of a nearly compulsive tendency to score points meaningful only, if at all, in terms of the Politburo’s internal rivalries.

After that stormy sessions, all was again serene and jovial, as is the way of Soviet negotiators when they have at last discovered what the negotiating limits are.

In my view one of the worst mistakes in a negotiation is to ask for something that is clearly unfulfillable. However tough such a demand sounds, it changes the psychological balance in a perverse way. Since the other side may not wish to admit the limitations of its power or influence, it may invent reasons for the refusal that sour the entire relationship. And the party that has put forward the proposal will be faced with either breaking off the negotiation or, if it proceeds, suggesting that its demands need not to be taken seriously.

Yet underlying our exploration of these many facets of negotiation will be a sobering truth: the techniques of reaching agreement, however creative, depend for the ultimate success on the accuracy of underlying assumptions about the world, judgments about the parties’ real interests, and in-depth knowledge of history, politics, economics, and culture. Process insights in the service of flawed objectives or divorced from an understanding of the true situation are unlikely to yield much of value.

I made a considerable effort to leave no doubt about our fundamental approach. Only romantics think they can prevail in negotiation by trickery; only pedants believe in the advantage of obfuscation. In a society of sovereign states, an agreement will be maintained only if all parties consider it in their interest. They must have a sense of participation in the result. The art of diplomacy is not to outsmart the other side but to convince it either of common interests of of penalties if an impasse continues. The wise diplomat understands that he cannot afford to trick his opponent; in the long run a reputation for reliability and fairness is an important asset. The same negotiators meet over and over again; their ability to deal with one another is undermined if a diplomat acquires a reputation for evasion or duplicity.

I have always believed that the secret of negotiations is meticulous preparation. The negotiator should know not only the technical side of the subject but its nuances. He must above all have a clear conception of his objectives and the routes to reach them. He must study the psychology and purposes of his opposite number and determine whether and how to reconcile them with his own. He must have all this at his fingertips because the impression of indecisiveness invites hesitation or intransigence; the need for frequent consultation at the negotiating table undermines authority. This is why my associates and I repaired to Key Biscayne over the weekend of June 19-20 to review the briefing papers, which had already been rewritten many times — and were to be rewritten again several times more before we set off.

Empathy and assertiveness can be a potent combination. An empathetic style in negotiation is not the same as one expressing agreement or sympathy, but instead involves showing the other party your understanding of its perspective. This approach may have softened reflexive South African defensiveness. At the same time, Kissinger’s actions and requests (US denunciation of South African policies, US backing of harsh UN resolutions condemning South Africa, and US demands for Vorster to put serious pressure on Rhodesia) were highly assertive in substance — even though, during face-to-face negotiations, delivered “softly.”

Effective negotiation often requires more than persuasive verbal exchange; actions away from the table to orchestrate incentives and penalties can be crucial to include the desired “yes.”

During his years as a Harvard academic, prior to serving in government, Kissinger harshly criticized negotiations that were not pursuant to a clear set of larger interests and thus, in his view, that were consumed with largely meaningless tactical choices. For example, with respect to arms control, he argued that “because we lack a strategic doctrine… it is inevitable that our proposals… are fitful… developed as a compromise between competing groups and without an overall sense of purpose… typically we have been forced to assemble a set of hasty proposals because we have agreed to go to a conference under the pressure of world opinion… Attention has been focused on a fruitless controversy over whether we should be ‘conciliatory’ or ‘tough,’ ‘flexible’ or ‘rigid.’” In later faulting President Obama’s foreign policy for its lack of long-term strategic initiative, especially with respect to China and Iran, Kissinger echoed his earlier critique: “We must take care lest the Obama Doctrine become an essentially reactive and passive foreign policy.” More broadly, he argued that “Too much of our public debate deals with tactical expedients. What we need is a strategic concept and to establish priorities.”

More operationally and with respect to his team, he emphasized the importance of a continual and explicit focus on larger strategic objectives: “I have always put great stress on getting my associates to analyze where they are, where they want to go, where our country should go, and then work back from that to practical solutions… When I came to Washington, I assembled a group of really young, able, dedicated people. I would meet with them several times a week, preferably daily, asking the question, what are we trying to do? What is our strategy in the world?”

The concept of interests is core to a realistic approach to negotiation. For Kissinger, a sophisticated interest assessment calls for carefully probing not only the view of one’s counterpart, but also the historical context shaping those views. This “requires a sense of history, an understanding of manifold forces not within our control, and a broad view of the fabric of events.”

Interest can certainly consist of territorial, military, economic, or other tangible assets, but the concept is broader. In fact, whatever the parties genuinely care about that is at stake in a negotiation, tangible or intangible, can be understood as n interest. Considerations as varied as mutual recognition, a cease-fire, one’s reputation, or your future credibility can all qualify as interests in a negotiation. As such, acting as a “realistic” negotiator need not imply indifference toward moral or ethical concerns. Indeed, Kissinger believes that a negotiator can, and should, be highly realistic about how to best negotiate to advance idealistic objectives.

Kissinger stresses the narrowness and practical limitations of this view. “Historically, negotiators have rarely relied exclusively on the persuasiveness of the argument,” he averred. “A country’s bargaining position has traditionally depended not only on the logic of its proposals but also on the penalties it could exact for the other side’s failure to agree.” For Kissinger, artificially separating actions at and away from the table is almost analytically, and practically, incoherent: “One fundamental principle that I have learned in diplomacy is that you cannot separate diplomacy from the consequences of action. The idea that you can have a diplomacy that is conducted like a graduate seminar without the rewards and penalties that attach to actions, it’s a fantasy.”

An experienced negotiator — which by this time, I was — develops a sixth sense for when the other side is ready to settle. The signals are usually matters of nuance: Some issues are not pressed to the absolute limit; some claims are marginally modified; the door to compromise is always kept tangentially ajar.

It is not merely distinctive individual characteristics that matters. To avoid error, effective negotiators must understand the limits implied by their counterparts’ cultural, political, and institutional contexts. This requires both awareness of gaps in one’s knowledge and a determination to fill them.

Along with former secretary of state George Shultz, who underscored the importance of “tending the diplomatic garden” for relationships to flourish, Kissinger observed that “It’s very important to establish relationships before you need anything, so that there is a measure of respect in negotiations once they occur or when a crisis develops. When you travel as Secretary, sometimes the best result is that you don’t try to get a result but to try to get an understanding for the next time you go to them.” Repeated personal contacts among leaders can help align goals and “keep the machinery of cooperation in working order.”

The opening of a complicated negotiation is like the beginning of an arranged marriage. The partners know that the formalities will soon be stripped away as they discover each other’s real attributes. Neither party can yet foretell at what point necessity will transform itself into acceptance; where the abstract desire for progress will leave at least residues of understanding; which disagreement will, by the act of being overcome, illuminate the as-yet-undiscovered sense of community and which will lead to an impasse destined to rend the relationship forever. The future being mercifully veiled, the parties attempt what they might not dare did they know what was ahead.

Kissinger urges learning as much as possible about the situation before advocating one’s own views, interests, or positions. In part, was we have highlighted, one learns through meticulous preparation. Yet even the best preparation yields incomplete understanding. As Kissinger explained, “Almost invariably I spent the first session of a new negotiation in educating myself. I almost never put forward a proposal. Rather, I sought to understand the intangibles in the position of my interlocutor and to gauge the scope as well as the limits of probable concessions.”

One tactic — and indeed the traditional approach — is to outline one’s maximum position and gradually retreat to a more attainable stance. Such a tactic is much beloved by negotiators eager to protect their domestic standing. Yet while it appears ‘tough’ to start with an extreme set of demands, the process amounts to a progressive weakening ushered in by the abandonment of the opening move. The other party is tempted to dig in at each stage to see what the next modification will bring and to turn the negotiating process into a test of endurance.

American diplomacy is urged to be ‘flexible’; it feels an obligation to break deadlocks with new proposals — unintentionally inviting new deadlocks to elicit new proposals. These tactics can be used by determined adversaries in the service of a strategy of procrastination.

The optimum moment for negotiations is when things appear to be going well. To yield to pressures is to invite them; to acquire the reputation for short staying power is to give the other side a powerful incentive for protracting negotiations. When a concession is made voluntarily if provides the greatest incentive for reciprocity. It also provides the best guarantee for staying power. In the negotiations that I conducted I always tried to determine the most reasonable outcome and then get there rapidly in one or two moves. This was derided as a strategy of ‘preemptive concession’ by those who like to make their moves in driblets and at the last moment. But I consider that strategy useful primarily for placating bureaucracies and salving conscience for it impresses novices as a demonstration of toughness.

Usually it proves to be self-defeating; shaving the salami encourages the other side to hold on to see what the next concession is likely to be, never sure that one has really reached the rock-bottom position. Thus, in many negotiations I undertook — with the Vietnamese and others — I favored big steps taken when they were least expected, when there was a minimum of pressure, and creating the presumption that we would stick to that position. I almost always opposed modifications of our negotiating position under duress.

Experienced negotiators know that few deals result simply from the brilliant insight or dramatic stroke. An intelligent strategy plus the willingness and ability on the part of the negotiators to grind away, pushing the process toward a conclusion, are often essential ingredients for a deal.

The use of pronouns by a counterpart can also help give you a feel for their actual importance in the decision and implementation chains on the other side of the table. The more in love they are with “I,” “me,” and “my” the less important they are.

Conversely, the harder it is to get a first person pronoun out of a negotiator’s mouth, the more important they are. Just like in the Malhotra study where the liar is distancing himself from the lie, in a negotiation, smart decision makers don’t want to be cornered at the table into making a decision. They will defer to the people away from the table to keep from getting pinned down.

Our cabdriver kidnapper in the Philippines used “we,” “they,” and “them” so rigorously early on in the kidnapping I was convinced we were engaged with their leader.

Only 7% of a message is based on the words while 38% comes from the tone of voice and 55% from the speaker’s body language and face.

While these figures mainly relate to situations where we are forming an attitude about somebody, the rule nonetheless offers a useful ratio for negotiators. You see, body language and tone of voice - not words - are out most powerful assessment tools. That’s why I’ll often fly great distances to meet someone face-to-face, even when I can say much of what needs to be said over the phone.

When they answer, you summarize their answers until you get a “That’s right.” Then you’ll know they’ve bought in.

On the flip side, be wary of two telling signs that your counterpart doesn’t believe the idea is theirs. As I’ve noted, when they say, “You’re right,” it’s often a good indicator they are not vested in what is being discussed. And when you push for implementation and they say, “I’ll try,” you should get a sinking feeling in your stomach. Because this really means, “I plan to fail.”

The problem with US-Soviet relations is not only that there are two competing bureaucracies with their assumptions and guesses; there are also conflicting conceptions of negotiation. Americans tend to believe that each negotiation has its own logic, that its outcome depends importantly on bargaining skill, goodwill, and facility for compromise. But if one side in a negotiation has only a vague mandate coupled with a general desire for agreement, negotiability — an elegance phrase meaning that one knows the other side will accept — becomes an end in itself and the outcome is foreordained: The negotiation will see the constant retreat of the party that is committed to it. Persistence is a negotiating position is disparaged domestically as “rigid,” “stubborn,” or “unimaginative.” No position is ever final. Critics demand greater flexibility; soon the proposition is advanced that the US has an obligation to overcome the stalemate by offering concessions. The other side, aware that we are in effect bidding against ourselves, has the maximum inducement to stand rigid to discover what else we may offer.

Like blackmail, it lays the basis for new and successively greater demands until, as in blackmail, violence becomes the only other alternative.

I was furious with him. I thought he was going to screw up our chances. But he was right, and he taught me a very valuable sales lesson. He taught me to identify the decision-makers who influence any sale. In the case of young players, it isn’t the player. It also isn’t the father because, generally, he only wants to live vicariously through his son. The decision-maker is the mother. The mother wants to know what’s going to be best for her son.

The setting for negotiations can also play a role and, as I said earlier, I found that the hotel in the south of France where Cathy and I go on holiday was a great spot at which to convince players to cast their lot in with United. It is far away from the madding crowd and, with its view over a sunny Mediterranean, is far more conductive to the notion of a bright future than a small conference room in a stadium or a hotel suite on a rainy day in London.

A nation can only take a rational view of its national interests after it has parted company with the crusading spirit of a political creed. A nation is able to consider the national interests of the other side with objectivity only after it has become secure in what it considers its own national interests. Compromise on any issue, however minor, is impossible so long as both sides are not secure in their national interests.

It is impossible to achieve by negotiation what one is not willing to pursue by one’s own effort.

On the other hand, the process leading up to the result reveals the parties in roles in which they would rather not be remembered by their fellows. There are more edifying spectacles than the bluffing, blustering, haggling, and deceiving, the real weakness and pretended strength, which go with horse-trading and the drive for a bargain. To publicize such negotiations is tantamount to destroying, or at least impairing, the bargaining position of the parties in any further negotiations in which they might be engaged with other parties.

Not only will their bargaining position suffer. Their social status, their prestige, and their power will face irreparable damage if publicity attends these negotiations, uncovering their weakness and unmasking their pretenses. Competitors for the gains which the negotiators seek will take advantage of what the public negotiations have revealed to them.

Seated on a stage with the world as their audience, the delegates have been speaking to the world rather than to each other. Their aim has been not to persuade each other that they could find common ground for agreement, but to persuade the world and especially their own nations that they were right and the other side wrong and that they were and always will remain staunch defenders of the right.

Gromyko’s method of negotiation approached a stereotype. It seemed a reflection of the national character and of Russian history. Just as Russia had expanded over the centuries by gradually inundating the territories on the flat plain surrounding the original Grand Duchy of Muscovy, so Gromyko preferred steady pressure to the bold move. He patiently accumulated marginal gains until they amounted to a major difference. He relied on the restlessness of his opposite number to extract otherwise unachievable advantages. He would hold onto his own concessions until the last possible moment, almost invariably toward the very end of the last scheduled negotiating session. There was no sense wasting them, he seemed to reason, so long as there was the slightest possibility that the other side might yield first. Against inexperienced negotiators — and compared with Gromyko most negotiators were inexperienced — this technique was extremely effective. Once one had caught onto it, however, the tactic tended to be self-defeating. Eventually it dawned that if one could keep one’s composure long enough, Gromyko would reveal he had more in his pocket than he had been prepared to admit.

Every negotiator must decide at what point marginal gains are no longer worth the loss of confidence caused by the kind of haggling that merges with sharp practice. Amateurs think of great diplomats as crafty; but the wise diplomat understands that he cannot afford to trick his opponent; in the long run a reputation for reliability and fairness is an important asset. The same negotiators meet over and over again; their ability to deal with one another is undermined if a diplomat acquires a reputation for evasion or duplicity. But there is no premium in the Soviet system for farsighted restraint. Confidence, if it meant anything at all, depend on a balance of interest that had to be redefined from scratch in each negotiation.

I made a carefully prepared opening statement that suffered from the professional deformation of all negotiators who are tempted to believe that impasses yield to eloquence.

It was hardly surprising that I began to develop the classic neurotic syndrome that comes sooner or later to all those diplomats who work in the field. There were times when Washington seemed to me more interested in positioning itself over what had already happened than in sharing responsibility for our critical decisions.

No political leader I have met understood the dynamics of negotiations better than Nixon. He knew that the process of talking rarely produces solutions by itself; only a balance of incentives and penalties can produce progress.

I had begun to be seized with a premonition of disaster independent of the issues involved. An experienced negotiator develops a sixth sense for when the other side is ready to settle. The signals are usually matters of nuance: Some issues are not pressed to the absolute limit; some claims are marginally modified; the doors to compromise are always kept tangentially ajar. None of these indicators appeared in the November round of talks; indeed, all the signs were contrary: Hanoi’s concessions were marginal and inconclusive; they kept the goal of a settlement always tantalizingly out of reach. One telltale sign was Tho’s persistent reluctance to let experts from both sides discuss the protocols — documents that were to spell out in detail the arrangements for implementing general clauses in the main agreements.

Commonly used negotiation tactics:

Auction: The bidding process is designed to create competition.
Brinkmanship: One party aggressively pursues a set of terms to the point where the other negotiating party must either agree or walk away.
Bogey: Negotiators use the bogey tactic to pretend that an issue of little or no importance is very important. Then, later in the negotiation, the issue can be traded for a major concession of actual importance.
Calling a higher authority: To mitigate too far reaching concessions, deescalate, or overcome a deadlock situation, one party makes the further negotiation process dependent on the decision of a decision maker, not present at the negotiation table.
Chicken: Negotiators propose extreme measures, often bluffs, to force the other party to chicken out and give them what they want.
Defense in depth: Several layers of decision-making authority is used to allow further concessions each time the agreement goes through a different level of authority. In other words, each time the offer goes to a decision maker, that decision maker asks to add another concession to close the deal.
Deadlines: Give the other party a deadline forcing them to make a decision.
Flinch: Flinching is showing a strong negative physical reaction to a proposal. Common examples of flinching are gasping for air, or a visible expression of surprise or shock. The flinch signals to the opposite party that you think the offer or proposal is absurd in hopes the other party will lower their aspirations.
Forgive Math or Generous Tit Tat
Good Cop / Bad Cop.
Highball / Low-ball: Sellers or buyers use a ridiculously high or low opening offer that is not achievable. The extreme offer makes the other party reevaluate their own opening offer.
Snow Job: Overwhelm the other party with so much information that they have difficulty determining what information is important, and what is a diversion.
Anchoring: Establish a reference point first in order to guide the other person more to your suggest price.

You risk insulting your Asian counterpart if you emphasize penalties for not honoring commitments in detail. Contracts are short and merely a tangible expression of the relationships being created. They are not treated as “fixed” legal instruments.

Negotiations do not prosper by debating points or sarcastic remarks of the kind we had exchanged; they require a balance of interests and risks.

Equating negotiation with merely “talking at the table” often risks failure, depending on the barriers to agreement. These can take many forms: economic (e.g., your counterpart has a better offer), psychological (e.g., there exists distrust, dislike, poor communication, or egotism), tactical (e.g., one party makes hardball moves, tells lies), setup related (e.g., key allies are not involved, self-interested agents selectively filter information) and so on.

In the course of every negotiation, a point is reached when the parties either conclude that they will eventually come together or that they are hopelessly deadlocked. In the former case, the negotiation gathers steam; individual issues are reconsidered in the light of imminent consensus. In the latter instance, though the process may drag on for some time, the negotiation is doomed because, from then on, the parties concentrates on shifting the blame for failure to each other.

Negotiation is a process of communication and bargaining between parties with the aim of reaching mutually acceptable agreements or resolving conflicts. It involves various concepts and strategies. Here are some key concepts in negotiation:

Interests: Interests are the underlying needs, desires, and concerns of each party involved in the negotiation. Identifying and understanding the interests of all parties is crucial for finding solutions that meet everyone’s needs and creating value.
Positions: Positions are the specific demands or stances that parties take during negotiations. Distinguishing between positions and underlying interests is important, as parties can often find creative solutions by focusing on interests rather than rigid positions.
BATNA: BATNA stands for “Best Alternative to a Negotiated Agreement.” It refers to the alternative option or course of action a party has if a negotiation fails to produce a satisfactory agreement. Understanding and evaluating your BATNA provides leverage and helps determine your negotiation strategy.
ZOPA: ZOPA stands for “Zone of Possible Agreement.” It represents the range or overlap between each party’s acceptable terms for an agreement. Finding a ZOPA requires exploring and understanding each party’s interests and priorities to identify areas of potential agreement.
Negotiation Styles: Negotiation styles refer to the approaches and behaviors adopted by individuals during negotiations. Common styles include competitive (assertive and self-focused), cooperative (collaborative and relationship-focused), or a mix of both. Effective negotiators can adapt their style based on the situation and the dynamics of the negotiation.
Win-Win Solutions: Win-win solutions refer to agreements that satisfy the interests of all parties involved, creating value for everyone. Collaborative negotiation approaches, such as interest-based or integrative negotiation, focus on finding mutually beneficial outcomes rather than a zero-sum game.
Communication and Active Listening: Effective communication is essential in negotiation. Active listening, empathetic understanding, and clear articulation of interests and concerns help build rapport, facilitate understanding, and generate creative solutions.
Concessions: Concessions involve making compromises or giving up something of value during a negotiation to reach an agreement. Understanding the timing, magnitude, and strategic use of concessions can influence the dynamics and outcomes of the negotiation.
Relationship Building: Building and maintaining positive relationships between parties can contribute to successful negotiations. Trust, respect, and open communication foster a collaborative environment and increase the likelihood of reaching agreements.
Preparation and Planning: Adequate preparation is key to successful negotiations. Understanding the issues at hand, setting clear objectives, analyzing the interests and positions of all parties, and developing a well-defined strategy increase the chances of achieving favorable outcomes.

In the meantime, the Chinese leader underscored to American visitors that normalization of relations with the PRC “would do more for American security than any number of arms control treaties signed with Moscow.”

China also stood firm in negotiations because its leaders believed that the Soviet geostrategic position had become less favorable and that the PRC thus had no need to make concessions.

The Chinese leader held a strong stance against the Soviet Union because he believed that China’s economic development did not require anything from Moscow; therefore, concessions at the negotiating table were the only thing the Soviets could offer China.

The side seeing itself as stronger demands more.

There were some things that the PRC would not compromise on, and it was important that the Americans know what those were.

Chinese negotiators use diplomacy to weave together political, military, and psychological elements into an overall strategic design. Diplomacy to them is the elaboration of a strategic principle. They ascribe no particular significance to the process of negotiation as such; nor do they consider the opening of a particular negotiation a transformational event. They do not think that personal relations can affect their judgments, though they invoke personal ties to facilitate their own efforts. They have no emotional difficulty with deadlocks; they consider them the inevitable mechanism of diplomacy. They prize gestures of goodwill only if they serve a definable objective or tactic. And they patiently take the long view against impatient interlocutors, making time their ally.

When they conduct Middle Kingdom diplomacy, Chinese diplomats maneuver to induce their opposite numbers to propose the Chinese preference so that acquiescence can appear as the granting of a personal favor to the interlocutor.

Cương quá thì dễ gãy. Nhu quá thì hèn. Nói nên nhu. Làm nên cương.

Occasionally, one had to go through the motions in order to win over popular opinion at home and abroad. But he did not expect negotiations to do much more than confirm power realities. When one negotiated with the Russians talk was not to be separated from action. “Negotiation and action are parts of one whole.” Action is often the best form of negotiation. It affects the environment, which in large part is likely to determine the outcome of negotiation.

Their goal was to force the Kremlin to accept a configuration of power that would eventually erode Soviet influence even within its own periphery. Given such objectives, Acheson and his advisers never placed much hope on negotiating with the Kremlin; building situations of strength was far more important than negotiating from strength. Negotiations, after all, were designed to confirm the superiority already achieved through action in the center and on the periphery.

Hard chairs make for a hard negotiation. People sitting on them are less likely to cooperate.

When a party pretends to negotiate, but secretly has no intention of compromising, the party is considered negotiating in bad faith.