Henry Kissinger’s philosophy, deeply influenced by realist thought, centers on the complexities of international relations and the pursuit of national interest through practical and often pragmatic means. Key elements include:
- Balance of Power: Kissinger stresses the importance of maintaining a balance of power among nations to prevent any one state from becoming too dominant. This concept aims to ensure stability and peace by deterring aggressive actions through the presence of counterbalancing forces.
- Pragmatism Over Ideology: Instead of focusing on moral or ideological agendas, Kissinger advocates for decisions based on practical, strategic considerations. He believes that states should prioritize their own security and interests, often requiring a nuanced approach to diplomacy and statecraft.
- Diplomacy and Negotiation: Kissinger underscores the significance of diplomacy as a tool for managing international relations. He is known for engaging in back-channel communications and secret negotiations to achieve peaceful resolutions, as seen in his efforts with China and the Soviet Union during the Cold War.
- Realpolitik: A hallmark of Kissinger’s approach is realpolitik, which involves taking a pragmatic, often unemotional view of global politics. He supports the notion that the international system is anarchic, driven by power dynamics and the survival instincts of sovereign states.
- Strategic Alliances: Building and maintaining alliances is crucial in Kissinger’s philosophy. These partnerships help to bolster a state’s strategic position and serve as a counterbalance against potential adversaries. He values the practical benefits of alliances over formal commitments or shared values.
- Use of Force: While emphasizing diplomacy, Kissinger accepts the necessity of military power as a tool of last resort. He believes in using force strategically to uphold the balance of power and deter threats.
- Geopolitical Management: Kissinger emphasizes the management of geopolitical dynamics to prevent conflict. He supports careful orchestration of international affairs to address power shifts, such as the opening of China and détente with the Soviet Union, aiming to create a more predictable, less confrontational world order.
Because information is so readily available, people aren’t taught to sift through it critically—to figure out what’s truly important. It’s like having a library at your fingertips but no guide on which books matter most.
Policymakers, tempted by this flood of instant data, often delay action until a crisis hits instead of planning ahead. They lean on quick fixes or “manipulation” (spin, short-term tactics) rather than reflective, thoughtful strategies.
Each success only buys an admission ticket to a more difficult problem.
If there is one recurring criticism of Kissinger, I tell him, it is that he goes to great lengths to preserve access to people in power at the expense of not speaking plainly in public. Isn’t now — of all moments — the right one to burn a bridge or two? Kissinger looks crestfallen.
While his choices were not without controversy, and his behavior — as he operated with single-minded intent to realize his vision — was sometimes maddening to colleagues, Dr. Kissinger was aware of who he was, and owned it. In his own words, “Accept everything about yourself — I mean everything. You are you and that is the beginning and the end — no apologies, no regrets.”
I want to thank you for stopping the applause. It’s impossible for me to look humble for any period of time.
The timeless challenge facing all diplomats, Kissinger observed, is having to make pivotal decisions when time is short, information is incomplete, and consequences are unknowable. Unlike the historian, the academic, or the analyst, Henry wrote, “The statesman is permitted only one guess; his mistakes are irretrievable.”
“What is right?” For Nelson Rockefeller this was the quintessential question, both naïve and profound, at once shaming and uplifting. It was the definition of his integrity. All that was twenty-five years ago. When that phone call came last Friday night, it seemed that our relationship had just started. And now, it was already over.
No one who did not have the privilege of experiencing Nelson’s selfless dependability, his infinite thoughtfulness, can possibly appreciate how desolate our life has now become. And yet we would not trade places with anyone; his friendship will be our badge of honor so long as we live.
He permeated our lives. He was always steadfast. He took enormous pride in the accomplishments of his family, of his friends and of his associates. He asked nothing in return except that they do their best, keep their faith, love their fellow man and set their sights in pursuit of honorable goals.
One of the few times he became impatient with me was over a decade and a half ago when I had just seen President Kennedy and reported that I had told him what I thought wrong with some particular policy. Did I have a remedy, Nelson wanted to know. And when I said no, he chided me: “You should always remember that a President is overwhelmed by problems. Your duty is to offer solutions.”
Some years ago, I said in an interview: “If I were in a position to choose a president, I would select George Shultz.”
George’s defining quality was his wisdom, which was frequently sought by presidents and caused him to be rotated through a succession of Cabinet posts until he became one of the most consequential Secretaries of State. George’s wisdom was of two types: the Greek phronesis, or practical judgment, considered by Aristotle as indispensable for statesmen; and the Hebrew chokhmah, or divine wisdom, for which Solomon prayed. Aristotelian wisdom is concerned with squaring means and ends; Biblical wisdom stresses the importance of choosing worthy ends.
As the decades went by, our paths diverged. Both of us remained true to our convictions, and they were not always the same. Arthur found occasions to express his reservations, though very rarely publicly and never confrontationally. It made no difference to my affection for him and my enormous respect for his work and for what he has contributed to our society. Nor did our differences affect his goodwill towards me. We went to each other’s major birthday celebrations. We met for an occasional dinner or lunch.
He was willing to confront the political leader’s fundamental dilemma that moral aims can be reached only in stages, each of which is imperfect. Morality provides the compass course, the inner strength to face the ambiguities of choice.
So Hans set out to understand what he considered the “real” world of international politics, not as he would like it to be but as he found it. He wrote his seminal work on Politics Among Nations, analyzing international relations in terms of power and national interest. He believed that a proper understanding of the national interest would illuminate a country’s possibilities as well as dictate the limits to which it could push its aspirations.
I would add to what Henry said that in addition to the urgent and the important, you try to keep your eye on the long-term trend lines because what is neither urgent nor important today might become one or the other by next year or the year after. And that’s a whole different set of skills that is required. I’m always reaching down into the building and saying, “What are we doing on energy security and independence? What are we doing to work with Europe so that they will come up with a common policy through the EU on their own energy needs? What are we doing on food security?”
So there’s a matrix of issues. It is exactly how I think about it: the urgent, the important, and then the long term.
I fundamentally agree-the relationship of the president and the secretary is absolutely key. The State Department has a tendency to insist on its prerogative that it is exclusively entitled to conduct foreign policy. My view is that when you assert your prerogatives you’ve already lost the bureaucratic battle. I saw the president every day when we were both in town because I felt it was absolutely essential that we thought along the same lines. I was lucky. I had extraordinarily close relationships with the two presidents I served. In fact, if one looks at the history of the secretaries of state, it’s rare. If they don’t have a close relationship, they don’t last.
Clinton:
What I have found hardest to balance is the amount of travel that is expected today. One would think that in an era where communication is instantaneous, you would not have to get on an airplane and go sit in a meeting. But, in fact, it’s almost as though people are more desirous of seeing someone in person.
Kissinger:
Because they have to have explained to them what is really being thought, which you can’t put through cables.
Clinton:
You can’t. And because press coverage, with all due respect, often raises fears and anxieties that are not rooted in any decision process. People sit around in capitals all over the world reading tea leaves, trying to make sense of what we’re doing. We have to go and meet and talk and listen, and it is a challenge to manage all of the relationships you have to manage when you’re on an airplane as much as I am these days. But that’s why having the trust and confidence of the president means that you can do the travel, check back in, report back in without worrying that you’re not on the same page because you’ve talked at length about where you’re headed before you go.
Because I started life as a professor, I was concerned with doctrines and theory. But professors have a hell of a time getting their concepts relevant to a contemporary situation. They don’t always understand that as a professor, you have all the time in the world to write your book. As a professor, you could come up with absolute solutions. As a secretary of state, there is almost no solution that you could achieve in one blow. You could only achieve it in a series of steps.
I would say the special experience of American wartime policy in the last 40 years, from Vietnam on, is that the war itself became controversial in the country and that the most important thing we need in the current situation is, whatever disagreements there may be on tactics, that the legitimacy of the war itself does not become a subject of controversy. We have to start with the assumption, obviously, that whatever administration is conducting a war wants to end it.
The disaster after Vietnam was that we would not support what had been negotiated. Whatever emerges in Afghanistan has to be supported, and it needs a legal framework internationally, and that couldn’t exist yet. I would think that it’s a big challenge that the secretary faces. But the debate ought to be in that framework and not “Do we want to end the war? How quickly can we end the war?” I take it for granted that the administration wants to end it as quickly as is at all possible. Why would they not?