The book narrates my transformation from an introverted, studious, reserved person to PM. I was unprepared for a life in politics. I lacked the multilingual and public-speaking skills. I was uncomfortable in the limelight.
I was not politically ambitious. Had I failed as PM, I would still hold my head high. I had answered the call to duty, and devoted my life to it. I have given my best. I can proudly rest.
I did not take it personally when rebuked by LKY either privately, in Cabinet or publicly, humiliating though it was. He was my mentor, master and teacher. I understood where he was coming from. I swallowed my medicine without bitterness. I pushed on.
What Goh did not bargain for was the resistance from the man he was replacing. LKY did not like Goh using the phrase “kinder and gentler,” revealed the latter. He felt it telegraphed softness, and more importantly, weakness in the new leader and by extension the ruling PAP. Instead, he passed to Goh a seminar text of political philosophy — The Prince — urging the younger man to subscribe to the tenets of the 16th century book. In short, to govern, it is always better to be feared than loved.
He showed little inclination for politics when young: all four childhood friends interviewed for this book said they were shocked when the quiet “Chok” joined politics. He was effectively monolingual in English, lacking not only other language skills but also the communication craft. In the words of Greenwood: “He has no understanding of how to persuade an audience.”
Upon taking over the management of loss-making national shipping line NOP, he asked his chairman to give him 3 years to make it profitable. When asked why he was that bullish, Goh replied that his intention was quite the opposite: “I was giving him notice that I needed 3 years to turn the company around, in case they expected me to turn it around in 2 years or 1 year!”
“You can get close to him, and that allows him to rally people. He’s a smart man with a lot of friends.” Even his political opponents admitted he is a nice man. Veteran opposition leaders described him as a “true gentleman” and “extremely likable chap.”
How would I have known that life turned out this way?
Despite his imposing height — 1.89m — he did not have ambitions of similar stature, let alone the appetite or desire to scheme and plot to succeed at all costs. He lacked, nor desired to have, the killer instincts of his schoolmates who engineered the putsch. “He’s too kind, too soft, too much of a gentleman.”
As his fellow Cabinet colleague, Lim Chee Onn, who also lost his father at a young age, observed, such a blow creates an empathy which sticks. “When someone tells me his father lost a job, I know how he feels. Chok Tong and I came from the poor, we know what it is like. If you haven’t gone through it yourself, you can imagine it, but you don’t know what it is really like.”
Nobody told me to do it. I just did my own schoolwork and revision. I was not the top student. I was only an above-average student. My position was maybe around the 10th. The best was the last year when I got the best progress prize — from 10th to 3rd. Maybe it was my father’s words — “study hard” — so I did. The neighbors’ children all could not study. Not that they were bad kids but they just could not study.
He pointed me in the direction of some leftist literature in English and I bought some Russian books. I was introduced to Maxim Gorky, Turgenev — I read those. And I came across this word — proletariat. It was a nice-sounding words and very impactful. So when I was in Pre-U 1, I wrote an article about dialectic materialism.
At the Pasir Panjang rally, I saw him coming from the back. That was his style — he walked from the back, and then he would pause there and listened to the speakers. He would sense the mood before he spoke. He watched there for a while, wearing all white, and he walked to the stage and spoke in Hokkien.
Goh was one of the star students in the university, said several who were at the same school then. “Goh Chok Tong was like one of the sure things. If you were looking to bet your money on who would surely get a first class, it was him.” His schoolmates expected big things from him. “The word ‘leader’ was not used, but he had all the good qualities — he was a good guy, had good character and you expected him to do well in life.”
Goh did well, albeit a little too well at times. Once, he wrote a paper on the state of Singapore’s economy — the first such report on the domestic economy — and it contained growth figures. Then DPM Goh Keng Swee liked the report so much that he gave it to the press, which published it. The next day, the young Goh got a note from LKY. “He said this economic growth figure was normally released by the PM,” said Goh, laughing as he recalled his youthful ignorance.
While its goal was to be a profitable business, Goh Keng Swee also had strategic objectives for the company. He wanted it to break the cartel, Far East Freight Conference, which he felt was responsible for high freight rates that could strangle Singapore’s trade. At the same time, building Singapore’s own shipping line would be useful during war.
We learnt, later on, that if we were prepared to pay a price, high insurance premium, there would always be ships which were prepared to go to the war zone. But at that time, it was a strategic thinking.
When you are young, you find that you can learn anything. It was not only myself who was new. Most of the people had no idea of ship operations. They book in a few people from shipping agencies, so they knew about getting cargo. But owning and running a ship — they had no experience.”
Goh was not sent on courses or training. There were no such privileges or luxuries. Instead, he had to learn about shipping through books. As unbelievable as it may sound today, the man who became the top honcho of the national shipping line was a self-taught notice who relied on 1960s versions of “For Dummies” how-to texts.
I could see Chok Tong would make a more suitable CEO. There was nothing wrong with Eric, but you felt that Chok Tong was steadier, very constant and straightforward. He didn’t say very much so you didn’t pay too much attention to him. But he was a very competent officer.
So, I asked myself, what is the real factor that enables developing countries to progress? Resources? My conclusion was that it was the way a country was led an organized. In other words, good leadership.
He was on his own, he was not a politician, he had no place to go and you could see that he wasn’t quite sure of himself.
At that time, the people had seen the results of the PAP government and their lives had improved. They knew the PAP wanted to do the right things for the people. They believed LKY would find good people. So even though they did not know the new candidates, it was okay, they would still support the PAP.
Let’s be candid, nobody voted for Goh Chok Tong or Lim Chee Onn at that time. They all voted for PAP and LKY and the leadership, that’s all.
A more important example would be spotting contradictions in the arguments. They argued for something here, but towards the end, they did not quite straighten the point. You found that there was a contradiction — those were more important. Of course, other more important things were whether you agreed with the policies that were being recommended or with their fleshing out of your thoughts. Ministers must have thoughts — we give them ideas and they flesh them into policies and programmes — and you have to help them shape them.
Lee said the PAP had to be proactive in the talent hunt. “For a long time, we believed it would happen automatically, by osmosis. Then we discovered — no, this is dreadful.”
The party must become a workshop for forging bold new ideas to meet the requirements of a rapidly changing society and a rapidly changing world. To do so, it had to renew itself. One of the most important tasks of politics is not how to acquire power but how to transfer it to a new generation of leaders. More difficult still is for leaders to deliberately create new and able leaders to systematically take over from the older when the time comes.
There were quite a few who clearly turned out to be more opportunistic than anything else. They were just seeking to further themselves, and not really dedicated to serving the people. We were really concerned about a few of the other members and had to intensify our watch over them. I even had to interview the wife of one particular individual just to make sure whether he was crazy himself or if he was dominated or controlled by the wife. Chok Tong was never a concern to the committee. We didn’t actually find him wanting in anything at all.
For one thing, his public speaking skills were poor. Unlike Lee who was a street fighter, Goh never really had to sell in public.
He would say don’t give so many figures, people are not interested in figures unless I gave some startling numbers, out of the blue figures. Otherwise, the figures would be inconsequential.
Goh discussed his problem with LKY who suggested that he ask the state broadcaster to bring along a short ladder when filming Goh.
You can all do your job, but there is no passion. I think Rajaratnam put it as no fire in the belly. We came in, we were all technocrats. But to govern and to lead, you must have passion or fire in the bellies.
For Goh, the fire in his belly took some time to heat up. “Organizing secretary (in the PAP) — I organized. Ministry job — I did it. But later, you understood. To move people, to get them to follow you, you must have that passion for the job, to do something.”
While most people go into politics in other countries for personal ambitions or a strong conviction that the government of the day was on the wrong track, it was not the case for him and his peers. “We never said we wanted to be leaders because of the high standing in society or we wanted to change the system, that this or that policy was wrong and we had to change it. We all came in because we agreed to the reading of the then leadership: that successful people, in business or civil service, if they did not come forward to enter politics, then the wrong people would come in, those with an axe to grind, people who had personal ambition to achieve; and that would be disastrous for Singapore.”
Nelson Mandela told me he could win elections and he knew politics, but he did not know economics or how to run a government. Thabo Mbeki would run the government.
The look on their faces was enough, they did not have to say anything. If they had said anything, it would have been swear words. It was not that they were stepping down, it was a loss of face.
If you knew LKY, you knew what he had gone through when Barisan split from the PAP. After that, he did not trust anyone fully in politics. Not even me. To be fair, this is politics and also because he learnt from experience. He trusted nobody fully in politics because he learnt it the hard way. Chan Sun Wing — his parliamentary secretary — and others just turned against him.
Tony was very thorough and meticulous; he would know the subjects in-depth; and once he made up his mind, he would not shift. In my case, I like to talk to people and sometimes change my decision. I was a bit more flexible.
We soon that they (the PhD holders) needed to have other qualities besides a disciplined mind able to marshal facts and figures, write a thesis for a PhD or be a professional. Leadership is more than just ability.
2011 reinforced a lesson I first learnt in Anson — never take things for granted, no matter how good the past result was.
The election became a Tin-Seah contest. But that is politics.
When you talk about how you are shaped, you are often not conscious of it. It is like growing up — at what stage do you become a man? You do not know exactly at what stage you go from a teenager to a man. But you find that suddenly, your thinking is very different. There are certain events you can attribute it to.
We felt the chance of losing was there, because when you walked by (the polling centers), people did not look you in the eye, they walked away very fast. You picked up all these things here and there.
At first, you were a bit naive, in the sense that was what you learnt in textbooks. You wanted to implement textbook knowledge. But on the ground, it was entirely different.
There was total faith in the PAP — invincible. People thought the PAP was invincible. And therefore, after this loss, you must expect more losses.
How do you prevent more losses? The PAP MPs must speak up frankly in Parliament. Otherwise, JBJ was playing that role. So, all of us had to play the role of the opposition as well, and intelligently. This was so that all the difficult issues were raised by the PAP MPs, and not just by one opposition MP.
I felt very uncomfortable. There was one battle when both sides used language which was so un-Parliamentary-like. Most of us just felt very awkward. Mr Lee used very strong language, but all within Parliamentary rules. It was very personal, very insulting. And JBJ tried to insult back but he did not have the same vocabulary. In other words, it was intimidation. Take out the gloves, as Mr Lee would say. Either I destroy you or you destroy me. I wanted to get up and say, stop it. For us, it was not the way Parliament should be conducted. That was the way other countries ran their Parliament. I was not used to such a display.
He did not ask. If he had asked, I would have said he had gone a bit too far. That was the politics of his generation. You have to fight to win. But our generation would be different and the make-up is different. We would not employ the same language which he would do. Hsien Loong is very articulate but it is a different kind of language he would use, because times have changed. And the other party is different.
You all think elections are so calm? We fixed it to be calm! Make sure the police tell them not to have any sharp objects or poles to carry the flags. Politics is not as simple as you think. It is harmonious today because we fixed it. In the past, it was very rough. The opposition had many ruffians. Ours were all gentlemen types. LKY tole me, go and get some karate people, get them to stand in front. Rough them up first, if necessary, then they would be afraid. Play by rules? Those are the rules. You are tough, so am I.
The effect on me was in understanding practical politics. I was not just organizing. Up to that point, as organizing secretary, I could organize very well. But Anson taught me that politics is more than just organizing. You have to win. How do you win within the rules? You must be able to understand the ground. You have to build up the supporters and you have to persuade people. But you need to make sure that the policies are right in the first place. If there is genuine discontent, try and get the unhappiness sorted out first before you call the election. If the mood is wrong, do not call a by-election.
We introduced differential pricing into public housing, with those on higher floors, having better views and enjoying more convenient locations costing more. Before that, HDB flats were priced simply according to the zones they were in. Such changes fostered a climate of competitiveness and fairness, creating a system where resources were properly allocated. They were eminently rational and sensible things to do, which were efficient and which would have created the right incentives and covered your costs, and would make the whole economy work better and really be a fairer system.
Mr Lee would say, “Why do you want to spend so much time getting feedback? Just decide and do it.” But I learnt early on that I wasn’t LKY. You must be practical. You must do what you can do. If you want to do something, you must ask yourself if you can deliver it.
By the time the scheme was implemented in government hospitals in April 1984, Goh had already prepared the ground for two years. Khaw praised it as an exemplar of a good policy. “As a result of all this hard and patient work, the implementation was a non-event. That is what a good policy ought to be like. The worst is being unprepared and, after you implement, people go ‘What is that all about’ and they start questioning why we are doing this — that would be an example of a bad policy implementation.”
To lead Singapore, he said, I had to understand defence. So that was one of the early signals that I was one of those who could lead Singapore. That means, I must know the capability of our armed forces. If ever I had to stand eyeball to eyeball with a threatening neighbor, I need to know what we were capable of doing or not. If you are a brown belt and want to take on a black belt — don’t, let’s not quarrel, negotiate.
Whereas, at my time, nobody in my cohort came from the SAF, except for Hsien Loong later. So, we could all be, let us just say, overconfident against any threat. But you have to understand what you can or cannot do. Do not be a bravado and do not be a coward. You do not have to give way easily — you know what you can do and you have backbone and you have people to back you up. But if you do not know the military, it becomes very difficult. You talk to someone who has big armed forces and can stare you in the face, and you wouldn’t know how to react.
He knew a lot about micro issues and can get into the details. But he was not a micromanager. When something was not right, he would ask questions. But he was more concerned about the big picture. For the small picture, he could know more if he wanted to. He would ask for the figures and would brush up and know more than you very quickly. He believed in getting the right man for the job and leaving him alone. That was the way he led.
When we went to Cabinet, Mr. Lee looked at me and he asked if I knew that Winsemius and Ngiam Tong Dow had been trying to convince him of this high-wage policy for the last few years! My jaw dropped. They had been trying to convince him for the last three years and he was not convinced! Then he asked if I was convinced and I said yes. I put up the Cabinet paper, so I had to say yes, for the reasons given in the paper.
Then he looked at me and said, if you are convinced, then go ahead. That is a mark of a leader. Whether his mind was changed or not, this minister was in charge and if he was convinced, let him try.
He said he was not convinced earlier but I said I was convinced. His earlier reservation was that you had to attract investments and create jobs. You have high wages and they would not come. High wage policy is taking a risk. If they do not come, then what happens to investments? Once wages go up, they would not come down. So, be careful, you up it, it cannot come down and if investments do not come, then what happens? He could have asked me that, but he did not. That was how he worked and that was how we learnt to work. But I think he himself was beginning to be convinced by this idea after three years.
In NOL, I had an administrative manager. He was very good but he wanted to do most work by himself. I felt that he was not delegating enough. So, I told him one day, you are a very good worker and you do so much work. But do you know that if you want to get promoted, you cannot make yourself indispensable? Because nobody else could do his job! In other words, learn to delegate. If you want to get promoted, you have to train people and delegate. Train them, then you are free to do other things.
So, again, from that philosophy, in the government, if you want to do more work, you must be able to delegate. Get good men. Always get the right person for the job.
Between an organization and a man, go for the man first. Do not try and shape an institution, perfect it and find a man for that. Get a good man first. The good man will shape the institution and make it a good one.
LKY was a very Machiavellian leader. After a while, it was possible that LHL would take over. These considerations led Goh to not get ahead of himself and behaved as if he was the new sovereign in town. He was well aware that an overreach by him would have led to his head being chopped. “If I had really thought at that point I was the next PM and started walking ahead of LKY, behaving like I was the boss, he would have asked me to get out!”
He made it plain that the PM would provide ideas going forward while the new team would make the decisions. “The style of government and the substance of policies will be ours,” he said. Unless the issues involved national security and survival of the country, he did not expect Lee to overrule the younger ministers.
But we must believe that nature plays a part. Mr. Lee used to say, how is it that when it comes to muscles and other physical attributes, you all believed in nature? But when it comes to the brain, nobody believed in him!
He told us very frankly that he wanted to clear the deck because these were very important matters, you people would not be able to do it. He was the one who was prepared to go and sell the policy. We could not sell it because we were not as well read as him. He had read and gone in-depth and he could defend himself logically. And, politically, he had the stature and capital to do it.
Along with other measures introduced by Lee, such as a proposal to push back the age to withdraw CPF savings from 55 to 60 and eventually 65, the ruling party paid the price in the ballot boxes. “Had it not been for the tremendous depth of support which PAP enjoyed, we would have been voted out of office.”
I told LKY that if Hsien Loong had an interest in politics, 1984 would be the time he should come in. And the reason I offered was that the 1984 cohort would be the biggest, about 24 candidates. And in politics, cohort counts. If he joined this cohort and he became the leader, he would have so many people supporting him the next time.
Or I could have been clever, anticipated all these, and told LKY that I had approached Hsien Loong and he said his family situation was such and he was not interested. I could have left it as such. Then I delay it by 4 or 5 years, you see. And I could play the game and not bring him in 1984, but wait till he was more ready in 1988 or even later. Then my position as successor would be stronger. But I was in politics for the country and not for myself.
By forming the Feedback Unit, he was signaling to the people that he was ready to move from a top-down “nanny state” approach to a more “bottom up” style. The nanny would morph into a buddy.
He said before, “Why consult? I just decide.” To LKY, if you consult, it takes too long.
While the voters wanted the PAP as the government, they also wanted to vote in some opposition to check the ruling party. Such a scenario might lead to a freak election when the PAP was voted out when in fact few intended for it to happen.
“Because of the lack of opposition in Parliament, and the population’s desire to see more, Mr. Goh came up with the idea that we should become some kind of internal opposition or proxy opposition.” But Goh said that was not his intention. “GPC is not meant to be an opposition. It is to get PAP MPs to be more insightful in their criticism. You want to have more considered, in-depth criticism, and not just your own ideas but the resource panel to help you. We allow them to have briefings by ministries, then they can make considered speeches.”
I felt the quality of people who might come in, at that point in time, in the opposition, was not the kind of people I wanted to do the check and balance. They were just chaps who could throw stones, who were good politicians who could argue, but who could not offer you possible solutions to a problem. So, NMPs are meant to be functional. People who are experts in the particular areas and they come in. They do not make flowery speeches, but they can offer ideas and they can criticize.
Goh had another reason for NMP which was less well known. He saw it as an avenue for the government to plug key appointments in the Cabinet if the preferred candidates had lost in an election. Specifically, he was concerned with finding the right men to be Finance Minister and Law Minister. Given the domain knowledge and expertise needed to fill the two jobs, he wanted a back-up plan in case the PAP ministers with these qualifications were not elected.
I have seen many new countries disintegrate after the first-generation leaders passed away. I did not want that fate to befall Singapore.
That is my responsibility. And once I accepted the job, it was to keep Singapore going. Then these other things followed. How do I do it? The obvious things would be to grow the economy. But the politics was very important too. You had to get the politics right. Of course, I wanted to win the elections. But I wanted to win in a fair way. I was prepared to win some and lose some. But ultimately, even if I lose completely, if the politics is right, Singapore is kept going.
We had a deep suspicion of one man, one vote. Democracy favors the man with the most persuasive tongue, with the most populist policies, and he will win. But you have no other way and you must get a mandate from the people. So we worked out a system where you put in stabilizers into your democratic system. Then the good people would be in charge. So, it is geared towards getting good people into Parliament.
These things are meant for the longer term. It is the way you want to govern and involve the people. You do not expect these things to help immediately or that people on the ground would vote very differently. They vote differently not on the basis of your Feedback Unit and so on.
You couldn’t go “PM, what is it you want me to do? Should I create the GPC?” No. You did what you thought should be done and you were conscious of the fact that he was still the PM. So what you wanted to do must in the end be cleared in the Cabinet. In there, he was the PM. So, you must do things where you believed the PM would support. Where he did not support, you must be able to persuade him. But first, you have to persuade your own cohort.
But it did not mean that the government would govern by conducting referenda or opinion polls for every issue. “We cannot become populist in policy making. Despite the population’s reluctance to accept tough measures, the substance of the PAP government’s policies cannot change. Policies must remain firmly based on logic, not emotions, however uncomfortable the logic may be.”
A day later, 8 of the 9 detainees were arrested again. The 24-hour delay did not please Lee. He said in a talk at NUS in 1988: “If it were me, the moment that statement was issued, there would have been a response immediately. Because that’s the way I act.”
Upon returning to Singapore, Lee chaired a Cabinet meeting and revealed his frustrations and anger in trying to get hold of Goh on the phone. He then turned to Chok Tong, who was seated opposite him, and in front of everybody in Cabinet, angrily remarked “If Loong is not my son, I would have asked him to take over from you now.”
“The team has shown guts in tackling tough, sensitive and potentially vote-losing issues. We tackled them because the problems were critical for our survival.” Goh regarded it as a compliment from Lee, although that was never the objective of him and his team. “We never set out to show guts. We did what we thought was correct.”
Somebody said they were just looking at the websites, self-radicalized, they were not doing any harm. All they say is that they want to go to Syria. You have Malay women here who said they wanted to be a bride of a fighter in Syria. Don’t detain; this is her wish — she has every right to go to Syria and marry a fighter.
For LKY, never leave a wounded tiger — he would fight to the death. On language, racial and religious issues, Lee would not tolerate any divisive views and activities.
We could encourage, as we did, PAP MPs to be critical, to be honest in their criticism, to speak out. But the people say — all of you are of the same mould; they want somebody different. That is the toughest opponent. In other words, it is a situation of success and total dominance.
I put Tony Tan No. 1 because, although Goh Chok Tong has got a faster mind — and he has, he has a fast, quick brain — there’s a decisive quality about him (Tan). He listens, takes all points of views and decides. After listening, you can’t keep on listening. After listening, you sit down and you listen to your conscience, your judgment, and you say, “Right, we will do this. And if it’s wrong, I will take responsibility.” I told Goh Chok Tong, “Look, you are trying to please too many people.” Even the pressmen, they badger him. He keeps on obliging with answers. I said, “Just cut them off.”
Lee did not quash it. “It is a possibility, which I will consider, when the time comes,” he said. But he added that he did not need to be the president to retain control. “Given me and my links with so many people, all I’ve got to do is to stay secretary-general of the PAP. I don’t have to be president. I stay secretary-general of the PAP and I can decide, I will have a very strong last word on policy. I don’t have to be president and I am not looking for a job. Please believe me.”
I belong to that exclusive club of founder members of new countries — first PMs or presidents of a new independent country. And even from my sick bed, even if you are going to lower me into the grave, and I feel that something is going wrong, I’ll get up. Those who believe that when I have left the government as PM, that I’ve gone into permanent retirement, really should have their heads examined.
Lee complimented Goh effusively, praising his integrity for being incorrupt in NOL, turning the shipping line around, and being unafraid of competition. Of the 61 new candidates fielded by the PAP in the 1980, 1984 and 1988 elections, 30 of them were talent-spotted by Goh. “He’s not afraid of able men,” said Lee.
Instead, the “humiliation” — Goh’s word — acted ironically as a release valve of sorts in the unnatural politician. Having been slammed so openly by his leader and mentor, it was as if he had hit rock bottom in his political career and could go no lower. Goh turned the personal crisis into a turning point to embrace himself for who he was, and urged Singaporeans to do the same.
By September 1988, even Lee liked the new and more relaxed Goh. He said during an election rally: “I said: ‘Speak up! Be yourself if you are angry, say so!’ The result? He’s no longer inhibited. He can talk about his inability to react naturally with crowds and in the process, has come through.”
Looking back, Goh said that episode freed him from the demands and desire, both from within and without, to be like Lee. After it, “there was a certain confidence that I would do things my own way. Before, there was some pressure that to be a leader, you must be LKY. So, by 1990, I said no, I would do things my own way. I would communicate in my own ways.”
But I wasn’t insecure about him staying on as secretary-general. I had self-confidence. I mean, in the end, he would step down. If I said no to him and he went out of the party, he might be a Mahathir or do a Mahathir.
Can you win elections? That is the same question I asked of the 4th generation leaders now. They can govern, but can they win elections? That is the question. Can you mobilize and will people follow you?
And in an iconic photograph snapped of the historic moment, Lee was shown in the background for the first time in decades, as Goh strode to the fore. The symbolism was not lost on Goh. “I’ve got the photograph at home,” he shared.
People wanted a change. LKY was there for a long time and people wanted a change. And people knew that I was not LKY and they accepted me. In fact, they wanted a more ordinary kind of PM. A more human one.
Goh Keng Swee, Minister for Finance, was a frugal with government expenses as he was with his own. I gathered statistics for his Budget speeches. He told me with a wry smile that whenever a minister stepped into his room, he would say “no,” even before the minister spoke. He knew the purpose. When the minister asked for an increase in his ministry’s budget, Goh Keng Swee would still say “no.” Only when the minister persisted would he then listen.
Why do high-flyers in the private sector shun politics? Changes in lifestyle, loss of privacy, lack of personal freedom, family considerations and the heavy responsibility of a Minister are the main factors. The sizeable loss in income is also a factor. We are also victims of our own success. When the country is doing well, successful Singaporeans would rather pursue personal aspirations and ideals than be scrutinized, and even vilified, in politics. Social media and fake news only make things worse.
I hope highly able Singaporeans would not wait till the aircraft engine is sputtering before deciding to come on board to fix it.
If the country fails to assemble the best team to serve, Singapore will slide into mediocrity. Getting the best to serve Singapore goes beyond the interest of the PAP. It is our common interest. It is our responsibility.
Factionalism, vested interests, strife, dysfunction and discontinuity are more often the reality in political succession. We must avoid a situation where a former PM has to come back and save his country at the age of 92!
Watch the Health Ministry’s budget like you should your waistline.
LKY was initially disdainful of my consultative style. He thought it wasted time. But it worked for me, and Singapore. I stayed true to my pledge that I would walk in my own pair of shoes, not his.