One of Rumsfeld’s “rules” is that “weakness is provocative.”


Power is like the weather. Everyone depends on it and talks about it, but few understand it. Power is also like love, easier to experience than to define or measure, but no less real for that. The dictionary tell us that power is the capacity to do things. At this most general level, power means the ability to get the outcomes one wants. There are several ways to affect the behavior of others. You can coerce them with threats; you can induce them with payments; or you can attract and co-opt them to want what you want.


Power may evaporate when the context changes. The playground bully who terrorizes other children and makes them jump at his command loses his power as soon as the class returns from recess to a strict classroom. A cruel dictator can lock up or execute a dissident, but that may not prove his power if the dissenter was really seeking martyrdom. Power always depends on the context in which the relationship exists.


The agenda of world politics has become like a three-dimensional chess game in which one can win only by playing vertically as well as horizontally. On the top board of classic interstate military issues, the US is indeed the only superpower with global military reach. However, on the middle board of interstate economic issues, the distribution of power is multipolar. The US cannot obtain the outcomes it wants on trade, antitrust, or financial regulation issues without the agreement of the EU, Japan, China, and others. On the bottom board of transnational issues like terrorism, international crime, climate change, and the spread of infectious diseases, power is widely distributed and chaotically organized among state and nonstate actors.


Soft power rests on the ability to shape the preferences of others. At the personal level, we are all familiar with the power of attraction and seduction. In a relationship or a marriage, power does not necessarily reside with the larger partner, but in the mysterious chemistry of attraction. And in the business world, smart executives know that leadership is not just a matter of issuing commands, but also involves leading by example and attracting others to do what you want. It is difficult to run a large organization by commands alone. You also need to get others to buy in to your values. Similarly, contemporary practices of community-based policing rely on making the police sufficiently friendly and attractive that a community wants to help them achieve shared objectives.

Political leaders have long understood the power that comes from attraction. If I can get you to want to do what I want, then I do not have to use carrots and sticks to make you do it. Whereas leaders in authoritarian countries can use coercion and issue commands, politicians in democracies have to rely more on a combination of inducement and attraction. Soft power is a staple of daily democratic politics. The ability to establish preferences tend to be associated with intangible assets such as an attractive personality, culture, political values and institutions, and policies that are seen as legitimate or having moral authority. If a leader represents values that others want to follow, it will cost less to lead.

Soft power is not merely the same as influence. After all, influence can also rest on the hard power of threats or payments. And soft power is more than just persuasion or the ability to move people by argument, though that is an important part of it. Simply put, in behavioral terms soft power is attractive power. In terms of resources, soft power resources are the assets that produce such attraction.


You can command me to change my preferences and do what you want by threatening me with force or economic sanctions. You can induce me to do what you want by using economic power to pay me. You can restrict my preferences by setting the agenda in such a way that my more extravagant wishes seem too unrealistic to pursue. Or you can appeal to a sense of attraction, love, or duty in our relationship and appeal to our shared values about the justness of contributing to those shared values and purposes.


Some countries may be attracted to others with hard power by the myth of invincibility or inevitability.


The Vatican has soft power despite Stalin’s mocking question “How many divisions does the Pope have?” The USSR once had a good deal of soft power, but it lost much of it after the invasion of Hungary and Czechoslovakia.


Michael Ignatieff described the position of Canada from a similar point of view: “ Influence derives from three assets: moral authority as a good citizen which we have got some of, military capacity which we have got a lot less of, and international assistance capability.” With regard to the US, “we have something want. They need legitimacy.”


The soft power of a country rests primarily on three resources: its culture, its political values, and its foreign policies.


Culture is the set of values and practices that create meaning for a society. It has many manifestations. It is common to distinguish between hight culture such as literature, art, and education, which appeals to elites, and popular culture, which focuses on mass entertainment.


Soft power depends more than hard power upon the existence of willing interpreters and receivers. Moreover, attraction often has a diffuse effect, creating general influence rather than producing an easily observable specific action. Just as money can be invested, politicians speak of storing up political capital to be drawn on in future circumstances. Of course, such goodwill may not ultimately be honored, and diffuse reciprocity is less tangible than an immediate exchange. Nonetheless, the indirect effects of attraction and a diffuse influence can make a significant difference in obtaining a favorable outcomes in bargaining situations.


Other skeptics object to using the term “soft power” in international politics because governments are not in full control of the attraction. Much of American soft power has been produced by Hollywood, Harvard, Microsoft, and Michael Jordan.


If that country can make this kind of thing, films about itself, oh, that country must have a pride and must have an inner strength, and must be strong enough and must be free.


Paradoxically, nuclear weapons were acceptable for deterrence, but they proved so awesome and destructive that they became muscle-bound — too costly to use in war except, theoretically, in the most extreme circumstances. Non-nuclear Vietnam prevailed over nuclear American, and non-nuclear Argentina was not deterred from attacking the British Falkland Islands despite Britain’s nuclear status.


Terrorism is not new, nor is it a single enemy. It is a long-standing method of conflict frequently defined as deliberate attack on noncombatants with the objective of spreading fear and intimidation.


Already in the 18th century, some Europeans were absurdly arguing that the excessive humidity in the New World led to degenerate forms of life.


Some conservatives disliked the egalitarian nature of American popular culture. In 1931, a former viceroy of India complained to Conservative MPs that Hollywood had helped to shatter the “white man’s prestige in the East.”


Another source of anti-Americanism is structural. The US is the big kid on the block and the disproportion in power engenders a mixture of admiration, envy, and resentment.


In some areas, such as the Arab countries, anti-Americanism may be a cover for a more general inability to respond to modernity — witness the slow progress of economic growth and democratization.


International students usually return home with a greater appreciation of American values and institutions, and, as expressed in a report by an international education group, “The million of people who have studied in the US over the years constitute a remarkable reservoir of goodwill for our country.” Many of these former students eventually wind up in positions where they can affect policy outcomes that are important to Americans.


How could the decadent West produce such great orchestras?


Exchanges were a Trojan Horse for the Soviet Union. They played a tremendous role in the erosion of the Soviet system. They kept infecting more and more people over the years.


However important the military power and political promise of the US were for setting the foundation for the American successes in Cold War Europe, it was the American economic and cultural attraction that really won over the hearts and minds of the majorities of young people for Western democracy.


The US, like other countries, expresses its values in what it does as well as what it says. Political values like democracy and human rights can be powerful sources of attraction, but it is not enough just to proclaim them.

“All countries want to promote the values we believe in. I think the most criticized part of the US’s soft-power packaging is the perceived double standard and inconsistencies.” Perceived hypocrisy is particularly corrosive of power that is based on proclaimed values. Those who scorn or despise us for hypocrisy are less likely to want to help us achieve our policy objectives.


Even after 9/11, America remains a country of immigration. People want to come to America, and they often do well here. By 1998, Chinese and Indian engineers were running one-quarter of Silicon Valley’s high-tech businesses, and such upward mobility makes America a magnet. Foreigners can envisage themselves as Americans, and many successful Americans “look like” them.


Some Americans have cast Islam in the role that was once played by Communism and the Soviet Union.


American intentions are good, American hegemony is benevolent, and that should end the discussion. To them, multilateralism means “submerging American will in a mush of collective decision-making — you have sentenced yourself to reacting to events or passing the buck to multilingual committees with fancy acronyms.” They deny that American “arrogance” is a problem. Rather, the problem is “the inescapable reality of American power in its many forms.” Policy is legitimized by its origins in a democracy and by the outcome — whether it results in an advance of freedom and democracy. That post hoc legitimization will more than compensate for any loss of legitimacy through unilateralism.


Regardless of what tactics are used, style also matters, and humility is an important aspect of foreign-policy style. During the 2000 political campaign, George W. Bush described America power well: “Our nation stands alone right now in the world in terms of power. And that’s why we’ve got to be humble, and yet project strength in a way that promotes freedom…. If we are an arrogant nation, they’ll view us that way, but if we’re a humble nation, they’ll respect us.” His statement was perceptive, yet polls show that foreign nations consider his administration arrogant.


Brent Scowcroft warned that “ad hoc coalitions of the willing can give us the image of arrogance, and if you get to the point where everyone hopes that the US gets a black eye because we’re so obnoxious, then we’ll be totally hamstrung.” A century ago Teddy Roosevelt noted, when you have a big stick, it is wise to speak softly. Otherwise you undercut your soft power.


France spends close to $1B a year to spread French civilization around the world.


One advocate of “Asian values,” former PM Mahathir of Malaysia, refers to the new concerns about environment and human rights as “European values.”


Most Europeans realize that multilateral diplomacy is possible even without a multipolar military balance.


America’s security and prosperity depend on its political influence as much as on its military might. The US has been strong because it has been admired.


In the 1950s, the mention of Asia conjured up images of poverty and starvation.


Japan is home to 3 of the top 25 multinational brand names, Toyota, Honda, and Sony. In the 1980s Japan derived considerable soft power from its manufacturing prowess. Seeking guidance on everything from ‘quality circles’ to ‘just in time’ inventory management, US corporate executives bought stacks of books on Japanese management techniques.


65% of Americans found Japan “admirable” and only 27% thought the Japanese “arrogant,” a mere 34% of South Korean found Japan admirable and 59% considered Japanese arrogant.


Thailand has even discovered that foreigners love Thai food, and its government set a goal of boosting the number of Thai restaurants overseas as a way to “subtly help to deepen relations with other countries.”


Many NGO claim to act as a “global conscience” representing broad public interests beyond the purview of individual states. In term of power resources, these new groups rarely possess much hard power (although it is worth noting that the budget of Greenpeace in 2001 was $157M, compared to the $90M budget of the intergovernmental WTO).


The reputation of the UN cannot be understood without contrasting the roles of the General Assembly (with its rhetoric) and the Security Council (with its vetoes), as well as the deference to regional caucuses that produces damaging aberrations such as Libya’s chairing the Human Rights Commission. The personality and skill of the secretary-general can also affect the reputation of the organization. Like the pope, Kofi Annan commands few troops, but his popularity and position assure attention to his statements.


Skeptics who treat the term “public diplomacy” as a mere euphemism for propaganda miss the point. Simple propaganda often lacks credibility and thus is counterproductive as public diplomacy. Nor is public diplomacy merely public relations. Conveying information and selling a positive image is part of it, but public diplomacy also involves building longterm relationships that create an enabling environment for government policies.


There are three dimensions of public diplomacy:

  • Daily communications, which involves explaining the context of domestic and foreign policy decisions.
  • Strategic communication, in which a set of simple themes is developed, much like what occurs in a political or advertising campaign.
  • Development of lasting relationships with key individuals over many years through scholarships, exchanges, training, seminars, conferences, and access to media channels.

Some countries accomplish almost all of their public diplomacy through actions rather than broadcasting. Norway is a good example. It has developed a voice and presence out of proportion to its modest size and resources through a ruthless prioritization of its target audiences and its concentration on a single message — Norway is a force for peace in the world. The relevant activities include conflict mediation in the Middle East, Sri Lanka, and Colombia; the allocation of significant funds to foreign aid; and its frequent participation in peacekeeping forces.


Indeed, some observers worry that America’s five military regional commanders sometimes have more resources and better access in their regions than the American ambassadors in those countries.


The region has not adjusted well to modernization. Half the world’s countries are democracies, yet none of the 22 Arab countries is democratic. Economic growth has been slow, approximately half the women are illiterate, and the region is not well integrated with the world economy. Annual income growth per head in the region averaged a mere .5 percent from 1985 to 2000, while military spending was the highest in the world at 6% GDP. With a population over 300 million, the Arab countries export less to the world, excluding oil and gas, than does Finland.


Germany and Japan were postwar success stories, but both were relatively homogeneous societies with significant middle classes and no organized resistance to American occupation. Moreover, Iraq’s possession of oil is a mixed blessing, since few oil-based economies have proved hospitable for liberal democracy.


I am amazed that there is such a misunderstanding of what our country is about that people would hate us… Like most Americans, I just can’t believe it. Because I know how good we are, and we’ve got to do a better job of making our case.


Skeptics about soft power say not to worry. Popularity is ephemeral and should not be a guide for foreign policy in any case. The US can act without the world’s applause. We are so strong we can do as we wish. We are the world’s only superpower, and that fact is bound to engender envy and resentment. We do not need permanent allies and institutions. We can always pick up a coalition of the willing when we need to. Donald Rumsfeld is wont to say that the issues should determine the coalitions, not vice versa.


If America is like no other empire in history, then in what sense is it an empire? The use of the term may point up some useful analogies, but it may also mislead us and others by obscuring important differences.


The most effective communication often occurs not by means of distant broadcasts but in face-to-face contacts – “the last three feet.”