Peter was a pupil of European learning, a jealous imitator of European fashions and culture, and yet also an invader of Europe, a would-be conqueror of the continent.


Maps like Witten’s made visible what Peter intuitively knew: Russia stood astride vast territories and bordered many lands, of which Europe was only one. But what were these other lands? Could they, like Europe, be grouped together as a single unit?


Just let people begin to understand that our outlet is in the Asia of the future; that our riches are there; that our ocean is there. In Europe we were hangers-on and slaves, while in Asia we shall be masters. In Europe we were Tatars, while in Asia we are the Europeans.


The focus of Russia’s leaders can change rapidly; the country’s infrastructure, its trade links, and its military emplacements do not. There is an enduring gap between Russia’s periodic bursts of enthusiasm about Asia and the reality that its interests and its capabilities are anchored in the West. This creates a persistent dilemma for every Russian strategist looking to play a bigger role in Asia. It also produces a pattern of pullback from Asia when exuberant dreams about Russia’s future role in Asia are punctured; when leaders realize that projecting power in Asia requires costly investments; and when the realities of Russia’s limited infrastructure in Siberia and its Far East make asserting an expansive role in Asia difficult or impossible. Russia’s interest in Asia fluctuates, but its limitations are enduring.


These subsequent chapters will trace multiple “pendulum swings” set off by a surge of optimism that soon dissipated as hopeful bubbles were burst by logistical realities, domestic disagreement, and military defeat.


In economic terms, too, Asia has always been relatively unimportant for Russia. On a regular basis over the past several centuries, many Russians have expected this to change, pointing toward Asia’s massive markets, vast populations, and rapid growth rates.


At different times, Russians have hoped that they might find warm-water ports, rich farmland, vast Asian markets, new lands open for conquest, riches, and glory. Only a small fraction of these hopes materialized, usually at far greater cost and initially expected. Many were naive from the outset; others were based on a profound misreading either of Asian opportunities or Russian capabilities. Rather than enduring interests, Russian foreign policy in Asia has bene built on a foundation of fantasies, on dreams and delusions.